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Abstract
This article investigates the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in transferring financial
and moral responsibility for the Eurozone crisis from the private to the public sector. Focusing
on Greece, I argue that the ECB constructed the morality of the public debtor in such a way as
to make this transfer of responsibility easier and the imposition of austerity measures
justifiable. This in part relied on a shift in the ECB’s discourse, which came to define the crisis
exclusively in terms of public sector responsibility. However, the ECB also employed a range of
non-linguistic policy measures aimed at intervening in the crisis. To interpret these measures I
draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘machinic enslavement’, arguing that the ECB
contributed to the Greek crisis not only by defining it discursively but also by reshaping the
country’s financial infrastructure in crucial ways.
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Introduction
This article investigates the Greek financial crisis and the role of the European Central Bank
(ECB) in transferring responsibility from the private to the public sector. The ECB achieved this
not simply by shaping the discussion of the crisis but also, and more importantly, through
specific policy measures that intervened in the country’s financial infrastructure. My starting
proposition is that the so-called Eurozone crisis, with Greece at its centre, is a manifestation of
discrepancies within the monetary union that were brought to light by a second wave of the
financial crisis that originated in the United States (US). At the same time, the private and
public sectors in Greece have become inextricably intertwined. As a consequence, the public
sector experienced enormous burden and subsequent deterioration of its own positions by
repaying central European creditors and endorsing Greek private banks (Lapavitsas, 2012;
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Varoufakis, 2015). This transfer of risk and liabilities from the private to the public sector was
accompanied by a shift of political and moral responsibility for the crisis in the same direction.
The ECB was operating, in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 82), as a gigantic
“assemblage”. It was an economic and political system of power that endorsed private banks
across the Eurozone through a spectrum of policy measures, while at the same time showing
reluctance to support sovereign borrowers. As Joseph Stiglitz (2016: 156) points out, these
measures have had profound distributional consequences: “The prioritization of banks over
citizens”, he writes, “was as evident in Europe as it was in the United States during the crisis”.
The aim of this article is to develop a genealogy of the ECB’s influence over the Greek
crisis through the domains of ‘knowledge production’, policy measures imposed by the central
bank, and institutional interventions via the Troika. I employ this genealogical method in order
to demonstrate how a substantial shift in the ontological and epistemological horizons of the
crisis occurred (Roitman, 2013). The shift was produced between the early phase of the crisis,
from 2009 onwards, when uncontrolled and powerful European and Greek banks were
subjected to ferocious theoretical and political scrutiny, and a later phase, from 2010 onwards,
when the allegedly profligate, lazy, and morally corrupt Greek public sector was singled out as
the main cause of economic turmoil. This change was not an accident, but was rather a deep
and complex embodiment of the polymorphic and heterogeneous systems of power described
by Phillip Mirowski (2013: 6) as the “Neoliberal Thought Collective”. As Mirowski shows in the
context of the US credit crunch, different elements were mobilized in the strategic blame game
to generate a change in public understanding concerning the economic causes and ethical
consequences of the financial implosion Greece experienced.
In what follows, I argue that the morality of the debtor is always at stake in credit-
structured constellations, which amount to complex and asymmetric systems of power
(Lazzarato, 2012; Graeber, 2011). To do this I draw upon Lazzarato’s (2012, 2014) elaboration
of Foucault (2010) as well as Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 2004), applying these theoretical
resources to the perilous economic situation Greece experienced in the wake of the global
recession, when its GDP decreased and tax revenues dropped as a direct consequence of the
American credit crunch. In particular, I use the concept of ‘machinic enslavement’ to elucidate
the effects of the ECB’s policy measures. This concept draws our attention to how the ECB’s
control over indebted subjects, including both individuals and nations, was exercised not
simply through its production of reports, analyses, and the like, but also through a repertoire of
‘a-signifying’ or non-discursive strategies, such as interest rates, policy measures, intervention
in markets, market indexes, and prices for sovereign bonds.
Morality of the public sector
Lazzarato (2012) emphasises how the making of an indebted subject always entails two
interconnected registers: the production of indebtedness through financial instruments, on the
one hand, and the production of subjectivity, on the other. He argues that a credit relation is
always accompanied by assessment of life, habitus, the morality of the debtor, and practical
changes in the subject’s form of existence. As ECB and IMF reports show (and their political
interventions in Greece demonstrate), average working hours, time available for holiday,
salaries and state privileges, national health insurance, maternity leave, and appropriate age
for retirement are all at stake in ‘structural reforms’. Lazzarato affirms such connections
between economic knowledge and elements of everyday life. He also identifies the tendency to
explain economic struggle and poverty as a lack of adequate self-management, including work
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ethic and uncontrolled (or ‘immoral’) spending habits, rather than the manifestation of
capitalism’s inherent destructiveness: “To make an enterprise of oneself (Foucault) – that
means taking responsibility for poverty, unemployment, precariousness, welfare benefits, low
wages, reduced pensions, etc., as if these were the individual’s ‘resources’ and ‘investments’
to manage as capital, as ‘his’ capital” (Lazzarato, 2012: 51).
In analysing the evolution of the ECB’s policy measures and institutional influence as well
as its production of knowledge regarding the crisis, I endeavour to re-politicise and re-socialise
our understanding of finance (de Goede, 2005). Moreover, I seek to reaffirm this in the context
of “the non-economistic understanding of economy” (Lazzarato, 2012: 42). Lazzarato expands
on the work of Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari in this respect: “economic production
involves the production and control of subjectivity and forms of life; economy presupposes a
‘morality of custom’; desire is part of the ‘infrastructure’” (p. 42). This is why the morality of
the debtor is always at stake in any credit-structured constellation, as Nietzsche (1994: 39)
argues in On the Genealogy of Morality, when he connects Schuld (guilt) and Schulden (debts)
(see also de Goede, 2005: 156; Lazzarato, 2012: 30). Finally, and most importantly, as
Deleuze and Guattari (2004) point out in Anti-Oedipus, markets are not constituted to
maintain the exchange of entities with equal value, nor to represent economic or indeed any
other fundamentals, but rather to intensify domination through unequal exchange. Deleuze
and Guattari do not place ideology in a representational register and superstructure, nor do
they oppose it to economic infrastructure. Instead they analyse economic reality through the
complex notion of the ‘assemblage’, which consists of different forms of social bodies, on the
one hand, but is also capable of having its own forms of enunciation, on the other. Deleuze
and Guattari (1987: 82) compress these two domains – superstructure and infrastructure – in
the field of immanency, which is to say that these domains are intertwined and interact
simultaneously: “perhaps economics or financial analysis best demonstrates the presence
and instantaneousness of these decisive acts in an overall process (that is why statements
definitely do not belong to ideology, but are already at work in what is supposedly the domain
of the economic base)”.
The political economy of affect has been an integral part of Deleuze and Guattari’s social
assemblage since their early work on Kafka. This is an additional advantage of their
theoretical approach for analysing the financial crisis, because all epistemological forms have
been produced in conjunction with a moral analysis of power relations and the production of
the immoral debtor. As Lazzarato (2014: 31) underscores, “machinic enslavement activates
pre-personal, pre-cognitive, and pre-verbal forces (perception, sense, affects, desire) as well as
supra-personal forces (machinic, linguistic, social, media, economic systems, etc.) which,
beyond the subject and individuated relations (intersubjectivity), multiply possibilities”. The
forms of ECB enunciation in the ‘superstructure’ (reports, analyses, press releases) and the
forms of financial production in the infrastructure (interventions through interest rates or
redefinition of collaterals, currency swaps or Troika measures) are expressions of the same
power, and should therefore be analysed together. This is the approach I take in this article.
Causes of the implosion and the epistemology of the crisis
The Greek crisis is usually imagined and explained as the exclusive result of national economic
and political problems, most often in the form of the country’s allegedly bloated, dysfunctional,
and flawed public sector. Yet while the Greek public sector does have numerous flaws and
these did indeed contribute to the economic implosion, public debt and budget deficits are not
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the most important, let alone the only reasons for the crisis (see Fouskas and Dimoulas, 2013;
Triandafyllidou et al., 2013; Pogatsa, 2015). In addition, it must be pointed out that the Greek
financial system had been substantially de-localised before the crisis through investments
from central European countries, the operation of financial derivatives, and international
ownership of the biggest Greek banks and companies. The strategic blame game is thus
played out in a constellation that confuses practices and metaphors about the public and
private sectors. Following Mirowski, we can think of this as another iteration of Gary Becker’s
claim that the only way to reduce inefficiency and corruption in the public sector is to cut it.
As Mirowski shows, neoliberal forces managed to regroup quickly and absorb the initial
shock of the 2008 crisis, only to start producing analyses aimed at exclusively blaming
government:
[N]ot unexpectedly, ‘government’ was fingered as the culprit in all successful variations; but the detailed
narratives have been recast to appeal to particular nations or geographical areas. In the United States, the
neoliberal touchstone has become ‘blame it all on Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae’, whereas in Europe the cry
has become ‘blame it all on the PIIGS and Brussels bureaucrats’. (Mirowski, 2013: 301)
Mirowski (2013: 96) credits Foucault with diagnosing “ignorance as the linchpin of the
neoliberal order” because it maintains the status quo. Further, the above manoeuvre shifts
responsibility for the crises from the private sector, with finance at its centre, to the public
sector, government institutions, and policies always associated with non-market
dysfunctionality and the propensity for corruption and inefficiency.
A similar practice was at play in the context of the Greek public sector, which was under
constant scrutiny and critique even though in terms of the number of employees (as
percentage of all employed) as well as the volume of public expenditure it was far lower (as
percentage of GDP) than the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
average (Pogatsa, 2015: para. 2). Also, on average Greek workers spend more time in their
jobs than German workers and far more than Dutch workers, according to official OECD
statistics (Chang, 2013: par. 9). In terms of corruption, at the beginning of the crisis Greece
was at the same level as the Czech Republic or South Korea, according to Transparency
International (Pogatsa, 2015: para. 5). Nevertheless, catchy stories about the bloated and
inefficient Greek public sector sucking the financial blood from healthy Eurozone bodies had
already been launched and fell on fertile ground.
In this context, it is important to note that the enormous increase in overall Greek
indebtedness during the 2000s as a percentage of GDP came mostly from the rise of debt in
the private sector. As Lapavitsas et al. explain:
Greek public debt had declined significantly as a proportion of total debt, though it has remained
considerably higher than in Spain and Portugal …The sectors whose debt has risen significantly in
proportionate terms were banks and households. For Greece, joining the EMU has brought rapid
financialisation, more opportunities for Greek banks to engage in lending, and growing household
indebtedness to support consumption. (2012: 95)
The internal economic and political problems of Greek society notwithstanding, Greek citizens
did not precipitate the crisis. A greater economic constellation was at play.
After the subprime crisis in 2008, the global economy slowed down and tax revenues
consequently decreased in the rest of the world, including in the Eurozone. In the aftermath of
the credit crunch, deteriorating positions of public debts as a proportion of GDPs were not, of
course, just a Greek phenomenon: “According to the IMF, general government debt between
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2008 and 2014 increased from 65% of GDP to 79.8% globally, from 78.8% to 105.3% in
advanced economies and from 68.6% to 94% of GDP in the Euro area” (TCPD, 2015: 20-21).
In addition, welfare states were under pressure due to increased unemployment in the wake of
the recession. Finally, states experienced unprecedented burden on their balance sheets
because of the massive bailouts of private finance. At the same time, crediting conditions for
sovereign borrowers had started to worsen because most private lenders were experiencing
solvency and liquidity problems. These issues produced higher interbank rates and higher
rates for all kinds of debtors. As Hein points out:
In the course of the crisis, government deficits increased in order to stabilize the private economic and
financial sectors and government gross debt-GDP ratios jumped up. These empirical developments seem to
be among the reasons why the euro crisis is considered as a crisis of government deficits and debts by
many observers – above all by the dominating economic policymakers in Germany, the European
Commission and the European Council. Superficially, this view seems to have some merit. (2015: 125)
If one looks carefully at the countries affected by the Eurozone crisis (Greece, Portugal, Spain
and Ireland), it is impossible to conclude that budget deficits and public debt before the credit
crunch were main cause for their economic turmoil. Spain, for example, had a budget surplus
in 2007 of 1.9% and public debt/GDP of just 36.3%. In both categories Spain was, at that
time, better than Germany. Thus, one should instead look to the global recession as well as
the huge current account deficit that is a consequence of internal discrepancies within the
Eurozone, if they really want to find the common denominator for all these troubled economies
in the Eurozone periphery (see Krugman, 2012a; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Stiglitz, 2016).
In her book Anti-Crisis, Roitman (2013) shows how every crisis, whether historical or
financial, opens a space for epistemological confrontations precisely because existing
scientific paradigms are discredited, given that they did not manage to predict the implosion.
This is what we have experienced in the context of the Eurozone and Greece. Roitman correctly
emphasizes that crisis and critique are always related, and that the ontology of the crisis
(whence the crisis stems) is inseparable from the epistemological horizon (how the crisis
should be contextualised and analysed). She further emphasises that the standard
explanation for any crisis usually involves the miscalculation or misrepresentation of a
substantial value. This is the case in Greece with the misrepresentation of the budget deficit.
But Roitman insists that one must go beyond this approach and ask how the infrastructure
operates and how the value is produced rather than just represented. However, she does not
offer an avenue for thinking through the changed ontology of the crisis outside of linguistic and
representational registers (see Selmic, 2015), which is why I draw upon Deleuze and Guattari
in order to understand how the ECB’s measures themselves shaped the economic reality of
the Greek crisis.
The ECB during the first phase of the crisis
The chain of events that came to be known as the ‘Greek crisis’ began to unfold in 2010, in
the wake of a global recession caused by the credit crunch in the US. While the discussion of
the emerging phenomenon was strongly directed toward the responsibilities and flaws of the
Greek state, ECB and IMF policy measures ‘on the ground’ were almost exclusively directed
towards supporting private sectors (in the Eurozone). Moreover, austerity systems were
imposed for disciplining and controlling Greek society through the reproduction of
subjectivities, as well as economic mechanisms that produced a further increase in inequality.
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Before I proceed with my analysis of Greek public debt and its interconnection with
private financial institutions (both Greek banks and banks from central European countries), I
first want to elaborate on how the ECB addressed the global challenge to the European
banking system beginning in 2008, and present some figures related to the exposure of
central European banks (predominantly German and French) to Greek finance (both public
and private). In contrast to US policies in the aftermath of the credit crunch, which focused on
slow consumer deleveraging and fiscal support, “the ECB in 2008-2012 did not embark on a
similar monetary stimulus; rather, its efforts were devoted to counteracting the effects of
impairments to the banking system” (Pisani-Ferry, 2014: 112). Thus, in the wake of growing
uncertainty spilling over from America, European commercial banks were undertaking massive
restructuring of their securities: they intended to swap their long term positions for short ones.
The scramble for liquidity as well as deleveraging was intensive, and the ECB addressed the
banks’ concerns by offering long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), initially for one year,
which is considered very long for a central bank operation (see Lapavitsas et al., 2012). In May
2009 the ECB announced the following:
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank has decided to conduct liquidity-providing longer-term
refinancing operations (LTROs) with a maturity of one year. ... Moreover, the Governing Council of the
European Central Bank has decided to prolong until the end of 2010 the temporary expansion of the list of
eligible assets, announced on 15 October 2008. (ECB, 2009a: Paragraph 1, 5)
We see here how the ECB initiated its strategy of supporting banks at any cost, not only
through the provision of short term securities, which enabled banks to swap their long-term
positions, but also through the extension of eligible assets as collateral. Although Lapavitsas
(2012) does not mention this, since December 2011 the ECB has offered even longer LTROs
with a maturity of two and three years – exceptionally long for a central bank operation – with
options for exit after every year. In addition the ECB, in cooperation with the US Federal
Reserve, started providing different liquidity programmes for US dollars as well as currency
swap arrangements. Given that European banks at the time wanted to reduce their exposure
in US dollars and American banks wanted to reduce their exposure in euros, the central
financial institutions provided conditions for liquidity intervention and currency risk reduction.
During the early phase of the global crisis (2009 and early 2010), one finds ECB analyses
that emphasise the importance of public sector interventions, the transfer of risk from private
to public domains, and liabilities that the state has taken on its own balance sheets in order to
protect private banks. Consider the following statement, from a 2010 ECB Financial Stability
Review:
An important lesson from economic history is that governments and, therefore, ultimately taxpayers have
largely borne the direct costs of banking system crises. … In many cases, governments also bore direct
costs and expanded their balance sheets through injections of capital into banks, the extension of loans
and the setting up of bad bank schemes. These far-reaching measures, which led to a substantial transfer
of risk from financial sectors to the fiscal authorities, also had adverse impacts on the public debt positions
of a number of euro area countries. (ECB, 2010a: 10)
As the crisis progressed, however, the narrative in ECB reports changed and the strategic
blame game, with respect to economic and moral responsibility for the crisis, shifted from
private to public finance, from bank balance sheets to ‘sovereign sinners’, ‘budget deficits’,
and ‘public debts’. The ethical implications of the shift are evident, because discussions were
no longer structured around the speculation-prone, unregulated, immoral, and destructive
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dynamics of private banking, but rather around the alleged profligacy of the bloated,
inefficient, and lazy public sector. This change provided a background for legitimising austerity
measures as well as massive control and disciplinary mechanisms aimed at addressing ‘public
profligacy’ and ‘improving the work ethic’.
This change in narratives was accompanied by modifications to policies ‘on the ground’
that were favourable to creditors in the EU financial sector, on the one hand, and detrimental
to Greek public finance, on the other. The ECB’s narratives and policy measures, therefore,
were not just affecting public understandings of the Greek crisis, but were also creating a new
financial and economic reality in the Eurozone. In other words, the ECB’s influential reports,
risk analyses, policy proposals, and press releases were running hand-in-hand with a-signifying
policy measures such as the decrease (or increase on two occasions) of interest rates, the
introduction of LTROs, and currency swaps. The crisis unmasked substantial flaws related to
the ECB. The supposedly apolitical and technocratic ECB, as Stiglitz points out, has been
making deeply political decisions, and “… in making their decisions, policymakers in the ECB
have to make judgements with distributional consequences” (2016: 161). Further, the ECB
has been focused exclusively on targeting inflation, in contrast to other central banks that
focus also on employment, growth, financial stability, and even inequality.
In May 2009, the ECB published a thorough analysis that underscored the role of the
public sector in protecting the banking systems of the Eurozone. The report also revealed how
high levels of risk were being transferred onto public balances: “Banks merged with
government support, or received capital injections, while in other cases banks had to undergo
wholesale nationalisation. The scope and magnitude of the bank rescue packages also meant
that significant risks were transferred onto government balance sheets” (ECB, 2009b: 14). At
that time the Greek government contributed €28 billion to the Greek financial system in order
to stabilise it (€5 billion in capital and the rest in guarantees), even though Greek banks were
relatively well capitalised according to the Eurostat standards and reports. I would emphasise
that this amount of €28 billion, which has since been shown as a liability on the public
balances, was transferred a year before Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou announced in
December 2009 that the Greek budget deficit was higher than had been publicly presented
(see also TCPD, 2015). Note also that in 2008 and early 2009, well before the announcement
in December 2009 that the Greek budget deficit was higher than expected, the Greek
government bonds had already become exceptionally high in terms of interest. This shows that
there was a more complex correlation between the progression of the crisis and the rise of
government bonds, which is not related solely to the budget deficit.
In December 2009, the ECB officially discussed the potential risks should states
withdraw their intervention and support (of private banks) too early:
All in all, the challenges facing the euro area banking sector in the period ahead call for caution in avoiding
timing errors in disengaging from public support. In particular, exit decisions by governments will need to
carefully balance the risks of exiting too early against those of exiting too late. Exiting before the underlying
strength of key financial institutions is sufficiently well established runs the risk of leaving some of them
vulnerable to adverse disturbances, possibly even triggering renewed financial system stresses. (ECB,
2009c: 17)
At a time of uncertainty in global financial markets, banks preferred to stay in short positions
and improve their cash balances by keeping deposits in central banks, rather than lending to
corporate and retail customers. Banks choose short term securities over sovereign bonds with
longer maturity, and the swap mechanisms provided by the ECB looked like a safe option for
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that. The fact that banks were reducing lending also contributed to the liquidity and solvency
crisis in both the private and public sectors (see Lapavitsas et al., 2012).
Machinic enslavement
Having sketched out the general conditions of Greece’s financial system at the beginning of
the crisis, I turn now to the discussion of ‘machinic enslavement’. The concept was originally
developed in Deleuze and Guattari, but has been elaborated on by Lazzarato in his recent
book Signs and Machines:
In machinic enslavement the individual is no longer instituted as an “individual subject”, “economic
subject” (human capital, entrepreneur of the self), or “citizen”. He is instead considered a gear, a cog, a
component part in the “business” and “financial system” assemblages, in the media assemblage, and the
“welfare-state” assemblage and its collective institutions (schools, hospitals, museums, theatres, television,
Internet, etc.). Enslavement is a concept Deleuze and Guattari borrowed explicitly from cybernetics and the
science of automation. (Lazzarato, 2014: 25)
The seminal Foucauldian concept of ‘governmentality’, therefore, could and should be further
discussed through the concept of machinic enslavement, in which individuals are not (only)
defined on the basis of their social positions or representational roles – as social subjects –
but also through “the governmentality of dividuals managed by flows, networks, and machines
…” (Lazzarato, 2014: 37). This is not Callon’s (1998; 2007) nor MacKenzie’s (2010)
calculative, usually apolitical and mostly rational analysis of technological assemblages in
economy and their performative production, but rather a Deleuzian analysis of different social
semiotics in which individuals are de-centralised, intertwined with networks, and produced
through flows and systems of power. This produces subjectivities not only through
representational registers and conscious behaviour, but also in “… the desires, beliefs, and
sub-representational reality of subjectivity. Governmentality is practiced at the junction of the
individual and the dividual, the individual as the dividual’s subjectivation” (Lazzarato, 2014:
37-38). One has to understand that material and immaterial networks are intertwined and that
they intensify each other, as well as human and non-human assemblages. Reducing the
influence of the multiple semiotics to just ideology, representation, discourse, language, or
media would be a substantial mistake, for:
Stock market indices, unemployment statistics, scientific diagrams and functions, and computer languages
produce neither discourses nor narratives (these obviously have their places but among enslavements). …
The European Central Bank raises the discount rate by one percent and tens of thousands of “plans” go up
in smoke for lack of credit. … Social Security posts a deficit and measures to reduce “social spending” are
put in place. (Lazzarato, 2014: 40)
Lazzarato mentions the ECB only once, but his point is clear: it is a machine, capable of
affecting the economic and political realities of entire countries. It operates through a set of
non-representational, mostly abstract, quantitative decisions such as the extension of
acceptable collateral for sovereign borrowers; or the redefinition of bank collateral coming
from a particular country; or through a suspension of liquidity, as we saw when the far-left
political party Syriza won elections in Greece. For example, on 4 February 2015 the ECB
announced that beginning 11 February 2015 it would cease to accept Greek government
bonds as collateral, stating that “it is currently not possible to assume a successful conclusion
of the programme review” (quoted in TCPD, 2015: 53).
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Lazzarato does not mention this, but the ECB also operates through representational
registers (see Holmes, 2014). It publishes influential press releases, annual reports, and so-
called stability research. Thus, I would argue that only a thorough analysis of the ECB
capacities on both levels – as the generator of a-signifying machinic enslavement, on the one
hand, and as a producer of signifying economic knowledge about the crisis, on the other – can
we better understand its role in the Greek and Eurozone crises and see it as an
unprecedented system of power. Finally, and most importantly, we must keep in mind that the
a-signifying and signifying practices create economic reality by controlling the political
economy of affects, which should be distinguished from emotions because affects constitute a
broader and more complex reality (see Marenko, 2010).
For Deleuze and Guattari, the production of desire is not part of the superstructure – a
view that contradicts the position many Marxist-oriented theorists hold – but rather operates
in the infrastructure. Correspondingly, I analyse the horizon of the political economy of affects
in parallel. Simply put, in Greece individual and collective fear, uncertainty, feelings of guilt and
responsibility were purposely spread through biased press and expert analyses, on the one
hand, and the ECB’s non-representational policies and measures such as the suspension of
collateral or reduction of liquidity, on the other. The manner in which responsibility and ethics
vis-à-vis Greek public debt were discussed and structured in public and subsequently
perceived and internalised by Greek citizens was one of the crucial elements in imposing and
executing austerity measures. With the acceptance of austerity measures, Greek citizens were
publicly shamed because of their public debt and budget deficit, in order to experience a deep
sense of responsibility and fear. Lazzarato (2014: 41) argues that “in the economic crisis,
asignifying financial ratings and stock market indices have dominated, deciding the life and
death of governments, imposing economic and social programs that oppress the government”.
With respect to human actors, he continues: “The signifying semiotics of the media, politicians
and experts are mobilized in order to legitimize support, and justify in the eyes of individuated
subjects, their consciousness and representations, the fact that ‘there is no alternative’”
(ibid.). A disjunction exists between these a-signifying measures and the ‘signifying semiotics’
that accompany them, and I would argue that this asymmetry applies fittingly to the ECB.
Localising responsibility
European governments and the ECB were doing their best to improve the liquidity and solvency
of the banking sector. Central European commercial banks were getting cheap liquidity
through the mentioned channels (governments and ECB support), and were then buying
lucrative sovereign bonds from peripheral Eurozone countries which started to grow slowly. As
Pisani-Ferry notes, several German Landesbanken exemplify how:
… in a desperate attempt to shore up their financial positions, [they] had bought large amounts of high-
yielding sovereign bonds issued by peripheral euro-area countries. Hypo Real Estate in particular, a Munich-
based institution to which the German government eventually provided more than €100 billion in support,
had invested €8 billion in Greek government bonds after taken large losses on subprime derivatives in
2007 and 2008. (2014: 88)
In 2011, during an official meeting between the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, this was established as official strategy. Consolidation of
the private banks was a top priority, so that the consolidated banks would be able to intervene
in the sovereign bonds market and push their price down (Pisani-Ferry, 2014: 109). It was
termed the ‘Sarkozy carry trade’ because the French President formally proposed it.
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This process further extended the exposure of central European banks to peripheral
countries, and I will now discuss the case of Greece. It is worth noting that sovereign bonds
from the Eurozone periphery at that time, Greece included, were not considered risky. The
aggregate debt of Greece (public plus private) in 2009 was around €703 billion, of which
€293 billion was public debt. The total exposure of all Eurozone banks to Greece (not only
French and German) at that time was around €206 billion, according to the Bank for
International Settlements (Lapavitsas et al., 2012: 103). The structure of the exposure is as
follows: exposure to the Greek public sector was 45%, to the banking sector 16%, and to the
non-financial private sector 39% (TCPD, 2015: 15). Direct exposure of French banks to Greece
in 2009 was around €60 billion and exposure of German banks was around €35 billion (TCPD,
2015: 19). Direct exposure to Greek public debt was around €31 billion by French banks and
€23 billion by German banks (Lapavitsas, 2012:103). The massive exposure of German and
French banks to Greek public and private debt demonstrates not only that they were deeply
responsible for the crisis, but also that they were facing a serious risk. That is why the ECB was
rushing to assist them at all cost.
The general market conditions in the Eurozone at the end of the 2009 and at the
beginning of 2010 help us understand the ECB’s strategies for addressing the crisis. Even
before the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou announced in December 2009 that the budget
deficit was much higher than had been publicly presented, politicians and policymakers had
shifted attention from any relaxation of fiscal policies towards their tightening. One can argue
that the Greek crisis was actually an unexpected gift for the proponents of ‘deficit-cut
fetishism’ (Stiglitz, 2010) and helped them bolster and spread their rationale for crisis
management and impose austerity policies across the Eurozone. Greece had become a
laboratory for threatening other economies: if you do not impose tough austerity you will share
the same destiny. Recall, too, the timing of the strategies used for fiscal control and discipline
of the Eurozone nations. They started before the Greek crisis exploded because, as Pisani-
Ferry (2014: 110) notes, “already in the autumn of 2009, barely a year after they had
embarked on a coordinated stimulus, ministers of finance started to prepare an ‘exit strategy’
from it”.
In 2010 one still finds in the ECB’s June Financial Stability Review an unexpectedly
nuanced genealogy of the sovereign debt crisis and the burden imposed on public finances,
despite its neoliberal conclusions. The report singled out a decrease in tax revenues, albeit
without mentioning the direct causes of the global recession in this context – financialisation
and the credit crunch – and also blamed pre-crisis fiscal problems, as well as the Keynesian
counter-cyclical policies that some countries across the Eurozone had begun to implement in
2008 before shifting to more neoliberal, pro-cyclical measures. Moreover,
.. the main reason for the severe deterioration of public finances was the activation of automatic stabilisers
– that is the loss of tax revenue and higher government expenditure outlays that ordinarily results from
weaker economic activity – as a consequence of the marked contraction of economic activity that followed
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Because the structural fiscal imbalances of a number of euro area
countries were sizeable before the financial crisis erupted, fiscal deficits in those countries expanded to
very high levels. Added to this were the discretionary fiscal measures taken by many countries to stimulate
their economies following the agreement in December 2008 of the European Economic Recovery Plan.
(ECB, 2010a: 10)
ECB analyses at the beginning of the Greek crisis defined the intersection of public and private
sectors but expressed concern about the potentially catastrophic spill-over effect only from
public to private finance, not the other way around. For example, the ECB reports draw
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attention to the risk of crowding-out private investment in the case of progressive public-
finance interventions by government; the risk of an uncontrollable rise in interest rates for
banks’ refinancing as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis; the dangerous effects of the
rise of sovereign bonds on corporate bonds; and the incapability of banks to issue bonds in
the time of crisis. By the December 2012 Financial Stability Review, the asymmetry of the risk
of spill-over effects between banks and sovereigns is openly acknowledged and discussed in
depth: “Similarly, several other key policy interventions over the period from July 2011 to
March 2012 helped to contain spillovers as captured by this index. In the last quarter,
spillovers from banks to sovereigns increased considerably, while the potential for spillovers
from sovereigns to banks remained subdued” (ECB, 2012b: 75, emphasis added). A similar
point is made with respect to LTROs: “following the announcement of the three-year LTROs, the
potential for spillover both across banking sectors and between banks and sovereigns
decreased remarkably further. While those policy measures seem to have helped to tame
funding pressures for banks, they nevertheless induced slightly higher potential spillover
effects across sovereigns” (ECB, 2012b: 76). Taking this into account, it comes as no surprise
that while public balance sheets were deteriorating across the Eurozone area, particularly in
Greece since 2009, the profitability of banks was revived as early as 2010:
For the first quarter of 2010, those LCBGs (Large and Complex Banking Groups) that report on their
financial performances on a quarterly basis showed a considerable improvement in their median ROE
(Return on Equity), to above 11%. … Indeed, for the first time since 2007, no euro area LCBG reported a net
loss for the first quarter of 2010” (ECB, 2010a: 14).
The first bailout programme – a prologue to catastrophe
From the end of 2009, when Prime Minister Papandreou announced that previous Greek
governments had been fixing budget deficit figures, Greece faced a series of internally and
externally imposed austerity measures. As the Preliminary Report produced by the Greek Truth
Committee on Public Debt (TCPD) points out, “[t]his paved the way for the deterioration of the
fiscal situation that allowed, under an ‘emergency situation’, to approve further injection of
public resources to re-capitalize Greek banks. These measures quelled the expansion of the
crisis to other European banks, effectively transferring the burden of the crisis to the Greek
taxpayers” (TCPD, 2015: 19). There are also, however, several crucial and ominous details –
not well known to the public – that should be added regarding the revision of the Greek budget
deficit at the beginning of 2010.
While it is absolutely clear that earlier Greek governments had been manipulating budget
figures through their derivative arrangement with Goldman Sachs, it is unclear how the figures
should have been precisely corrected and revised. The authors of the above report describe
further manipulation by the Papandreou government, this time in the opposite direction – that
is, a deliberate increasing of the budget deficit. This was done through a biased
reconsideration of certain non-validated liabilities that Greek hospitals possessed from 2005-
2009. The derivative arrangement with Goldman Sachs was also retrospectively overestimated
in terms of value related to the percentage of the budget deficit. The authors of the 2015
Preliminary Report estimate that through biased retroactive accounting, the Greek budget
deficit was purposely misrepresented as 6-8% higher than it actually was. The authors
consider the falsification of statistical data as “directly related to the dramatization of the
budget and public debt situation. This was done in order to convince public opinion in Greece
and Europe to support the bail-out of the Greek economy in 2010 with all its catastrophic
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conditionalities for the Greek population” (TCPD, 2015: 18). “The banking crisis”, they
conclude, “was underestimated by an overestimation of the public sector economic problems”
(ibid.).
As sovereign Greek bond yields reached a new high in April 2010 and central European
private banks, the main lenders to Greek banks and holders of said bonds, faced
uncontrollable risk, it was obvious that unprecedented measures had to be taken. The Troika
thus formed. It consisted of the ECB, the EU Commission and the IMF. The predominant aim of
the Troika was, as I will show below, to stem the progression of the crisis into the private sector
and create additional time for the private banks from central Europe to reduce their exposure
to both public and private Greek debt. In May 2010 the Troika’s first package, worth €110
billion, was formally accepted by the Greek parliament. May 2010 saw an increase in ECB
activities and measures, demonstrating the full capacity of this system of power. My analysis
reveals deep political layers throughout the allegedly apolitical and independent economic
institution, because all of the financial measures were accompanied by political decisions
made by either the Greek government or the Parliament. Let me note in passing that at this
time, when rapid and risky fiscal adjustments were imposed on Greece and many other
peripheral countries, the US was running a very Keynesian and counter-cyclical policy with a
budget deficit of 9.8% in 2009, 8.7% in 2010, and 8.4% in 2011. This provided the US with
the possibility of getting out of recession in a quicker and much stronger way than the EU.
It must also be pointed out that just one day after the Greek Parliament confirmed the
Memoranda of 3 May 2010, the ECB implemented its first measure directly related to Greek
sovereign bonds, which suspended a minimum credit rating for collateral issued or guaranteed
by the Greek government. However, the measure actually supported the holders of the debt
instruments, who were predominantly central European banks. This is an example of the a-
signifying, non-representative political measures that supported the private financial sector.
Finally, the ECB decided on 10 May 2010 to create the Securities Market Programme for
buying sovereign bonds on the secondary market. Time and again, we see that while the ECB
was hesitant to support sovereign debtors, it rushed to assist private banks holding the
sovereign bonds of peripheral countries in the Eurozone. In addition, the economic decisions
at that time were accompanied by a political ultimatum, evident in the following statement:
The scope of the interventions will be determined by the Governing Council. In making this decision we have
taken note of the statement of the euro area governments that they ‘will take all measures needed to meet
[their] fiscal targets this year and the years ahead in line with excessive deficit procedures’ and of the
precise additional commitments taken by some euro area governments to accelerate fiscal consolidation
and ensure the sustainability of their public finances. (ECB, 2010b: para. 3)
From 2010 to 2012, the ECB bought on the secondary market around €210 billion in
sovereign bonds issued by Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland. This significantly
reduced the pressure on central European creditors. But it was not until the crisis threatened a
full-blown dissolution of the Eurozone in summer 2012, that the President Mario Draghi
announced: “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the
euro. And believe me, it will be enough” (ECB, 2012c: para. 19). The statement significantly
helped sovereign borrowers by reducing the price of sovereign bonds.
The ECB during the second phase of the crisis
The conditions of the measures jointly proposed by the ECB, the IMF and the European
Commission require further analysis. Greece has to date received three financial packages.
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The first was €110 billion in May 2010. The second was a sovereign bond swap worth €130
billion in March 2012, and in June 2015 there was another of approximately €86 billion. I will
begin with the first package and its detrimental effects on the Greek economy. My larger
contention is that the first two aid packages were meant to implement a radical model of
economic, political, and moral control on the Greek economy and society. Correspondingly, this
provided additional financial support and time for central European and Greek private banks
to reduce their exposure to Greek debt, both public and private. The IMF openly acknowledged
this in a document from 2013: “A delayed debt restructuring also provided a window for private
creditors to reduce exposures and shift debt into official hands” (quoted in TCPD, 2015: 26).
Although the amount of €240 billion in total for the two bail-out packages was repeatedly
presented in public discourse as representing unprecedented support for the insatiable Greek
state, this was not the case. An analysis produced for the Jubilee Debt Campaign shows that
only 10% of the €240 billion paid through the financial packages ended up in the Greek public
sector, while “€34.5 billion of the bailout money was used to pay for various ‘sweeteners’ to
get the private sector to accept the 2012 debt restructuring. €48.2 billion was used to bailout
Greek banks following the restructuring, which did not discriminate between Greek and foreign
private lenders. €149.2 billion has been spent on paying the original debts and interest from
reckless lenders. This means less than 10% of the money has reached the people of Greece”
(Jones, 2015: para. 2).
The Troika anticipated a drop in Greek GDP in 2010 and 2011, but was adamant that in
2012 Greece would resume growth. All the predictions, however, have proved to be wrong,
mostly because the Troika did not take into consideration the specific constellation of the
Eurozone, rigidly implemented an anti-Keynesian understanding that underestimates demand
coming from the public sector and, last but not least, because they used the wrong formula to
calculate how quickly and how deeply the public cuts could go. Olivier Blanchard, the lead
economist at the IMF at that time, expresses this in a paper he authored. He and his team
ultimately came to the conclusion that they were using a wrong multiplier in a formula that
calculates how reductions in public expenditure affect output (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). In
2010 Greek GDP dropped 4.9%, and in 2011 it dropped 7.2%. With such an intensive and
spiralling recession it was impossible to meet any fiscal targets. In 2010, however, the
President of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet, was still decisive about the positive combination of
austerity and prospects for growth: “It is an error to think that fiscal austerity is a threat to
growth and job creation” (ECB, 2010c: para. 28). The exact figures in terms of the predicted
Greek GDP are revealing: “GDP was supposed to decrease by only 1.5% between 2009 and
2014 (-4.0% in 2010, -2.6% in 2011, +1.1% in 2012 and +2.1% in 2013 and 2014). In reality,
GDP declined by 22% in this period” (TCPD, 2015: 33).
During the two years between 2010 and 2012, the Greek public sector was completely
devastated. The Truth Committee on Public Debt’s Preliminary Report persuasively documents
the effects of the measures:
Successive wage cuts and tax hikes brought massive lay-offs, erosion of labour standards, increased job
insecurity, and widespread precariousness, with over-flexible, lowly-paid jobs where women and young
predominate. The minimum wage was pushed below poverty thresholds. Unemployment exploded from
7.3% to 27.9% (2008-2013). Public sector employment decreased from 942,625 to 675,530 between
2009-2013, with pay shrinking by over 25%. Private sector wages fell at least 15% till 2013. Youth
unemployment reached 64.9% in 2013, decimating prospects of accessing the job market. (TCPD, 2015:
38)
58 Finance and Society 2(1)
The second bailout programme was worth a total of €130 billion and contained so-called
‘private sector involvement’. It was actually a massive bond swap, in which private investors
agreed to a ‘haircut’ of around 53%, but also received an immediate award worth €34.5 billion
for it, in the form of securities with a maturity of one or two years. The new bonds were
guaranteed not by the Greek state but by the European Financial Stabilisation Fund (EFSF). In
addition, €48 billion of the €130 billion was allocated to recapitalise Greek banks. This
recapitalisation of the Greek private banking sector was transferred onto government balance
sheets and included in public debt figures. Regarding the time of repayment for the Greek
public debt, the second package – contrary to general perception – did not provide any
significant advantage. This is because the ‘sweeteners’ for private investors (€34.5 billion) had
to be repaid within a year or two. Coupled with financial obligations towards the ECB and the
IMF that were not part of the deal, this actually made Greek financial obligations during the
period from 2012 to 2014 worse than they had been before. It was only later that the public
debt was restructured and the repayment period extended. During the most intense part of the
recession, when relief was most needed, financial obligations were not reduced.
The ECB’s role in the production of knowledge regarding the crisis shifted over time. I
have shown how at the beginning of the financial turmoil in 2009 and 2010 one can
distinguish a nuanced genealogy of the crisis in ECB materials, which demonstrates a transfer
of the burden from the private to the public sector. As the crisis progressed, however, the tone
changed substantially and focused instead on fiscal and structural discipline as well as risks
associated with the profligacy of sovereign borrowers. In June 2012, for example, the ECB
published the following statement:
The first – and arguably most concerning – key risk to euro area financial stability relates to sovereign
vulnerabilities at the heart of this stage of the financial crisis, the origins of which lie half a decade in the
past. A resurgence in sovereign market tensions within some euro area countries has implied renewed
increases in bond yields, along with signs of tension in bond markets. The containment and reversal of such
trends rests upon action to address vulnerabilities that persist amongst several sovereigns. It is clear that
several euro area countries need to repair both their fiscal positions and prospects, as do other major
advanced economies. (ECB, 2012a: 8)
The causes of the crisis are thus attributed to sovereign vulnerabilities. Moreover, fiscal
positions are placed at the centre of economic prospects, not counter cyclical and state-
mediated investments in innovation and strategic industries, which are only capable of
generating growth for the troubled economies (see Mazzucato, 2015).
Conclusion
In closing, I want to emphasise that the progression of the so called ‘sovereign debt’ crisis in
the Eurozone, with Greece at its centre, illustrates two parallel processes. The first relates to
the global recession caused by private banks and the bolstering of the private financial sector
by state(s) and international institutions such as the ECB and the IMF. The second relates to
the production of specific knowledge regarding the supposed moral and economic
dysfunctionality of the public sector. What these two processes have in common is their
transfer of financial and moral burden from private financial institutions and their
shareholders to the public sector and ordinary tax payers. Within economic and political
constellations, sovereign creditors – with the ECB at the centre – used their systems of power
to discredit sovereign borrowers, and attributed the causes of the crisis almost exclusively to
the Greek public sector. This rationale was the main instrument for legitimising and
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intensifying austerity measures, which ostensibly aimed at improving the Greek economic and
moral infrastructure, but in reality were destroying the economy and society. In Greece these
measures produced what Mirowski (2013: 137), drawing on Antonin Artaud, has termed the
“neoliberal theatre of cruelty”, in which the actual victims of the Eurozone crisis were labelled
as the main culprits.
The goal of the strategic blame game can now be clearly elaborated. While the vast
majority of private banks in the central areas of the Eurozone, those highly exposed to
sovereign bonds of the peripheral countries as well as subprime toxic assets from the US,
managed to quickly consolidate their positions and regain profitability in 2010 (albeit with ECB
support), countries at the periphery and Greece in particular have gone through a prolonged
and detrimental period of recession and austerity. The private sector experienced a one-off
loss in 2012 in terms of bond swaps as part of the second bailout, but this is incomparable
with the overall losses transferred onto the Greek state. I have shown that this complex
manoeuvre resulted in financial costs for the crisis and for private bank consolidation being
paid for mostly by the public sectors of the proscribed Eurozone periphery, especially Greece.
But in order for this manoeuvre to operate smoothly and remain disguised, with the ECB as the
main operator, the Eurozone “morality play” (Krugman, 2016: par. 13) had to be publicly
performed. Moreover, in the rest of Europe there is occasionally a perverse satisfaction in
watching the Greek theatre of cruelty, as Mirowski (2013) notes in the American context,
related perhaps to the fact that people elsewhere, no matter how gloomy their austerity is, still
enjoy relative stability in comparison to Greece, where youth unemployment reached 50%,
public debt to GDP reached 180%, a third of GDP was wiped out, and massive brain drain
occurred, all of which led to a suffocation of alternative futures.
In order to better understand the depth and totality of the Greek crisis, I have proposed a
genealogical reading on two levels – financial infrastructure and explanatory superstructure –
and correlated them synchronically. I hope to have demonstrated how the economic reality
evolved, the role of biased knowledge production in the crisis, and its human consequences.
My aim was to elucidate these two parallel processes in the context of the ECB and the Greek
public sector, and consequently show how the measures implemented by the ECB bolstered
the private sector at the expense of the general public.
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